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Abstract
This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly
informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. The main
focus of the paper lies in the analysis of the costs of delegation, primarily agency
costs, versus their benefits, primarily the flexibility of the action choice.
We first determine and characterize the properties of the optimal flexible con-
tract. We then show that the higher the agent’s degree of risk aversion, the higher
is the agency costs of delegation and the less profitable a flexible contract relative
to a rigid one. When the parties to not have sharp probability beliefs, the agent’s
degree of imprecision aversion introduces another agency cost, which again reduces
the relative profitability of flexible contracts.
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1 Introduction
Motivation. A central problem in organizations is the fact that agents assigned a given
task may end up having, at the time they have to act, some superior information on the
suitability of the various actions which can be taken to perform the assigned task. As a
consequence, it may be desirable, in order to enhance the performance of the organization,
to grant agents some degree of discretion in their choice of which action to undertake, or
to ask them to report their information before specifying which action should be carried
out. The obvious difficulty in doing this is that the interests of such agents may not be
aligned with those of the organization. This difficulty can be mitigated and possibly elim-
inated with the use of appropriate monetary transfers to the agents, that is of appropriate
compensation contracts. For such contracts to work, some risk must be typically shifted
to the agents. If agents are risk averse, doing this is costly. Moreover, if the nature of
the possible realizations of the uncertainty, that is of the possible circumstances in which
the actions might have to be taken and of their consequences, is not clearly understood a
priori, either because some unforeseen contingencies may arise or because the probabilities
of the possible events may be ’ambiguous’, some further difficulties and costs arise.
The presence of these costs implies that, in the decision of whether or not and to
which extent to delegate to an agent the choice of which action to undertake, a trade-
off is faced. On the one hand, the wider the uncertainty concerning the environment in
which the agent will have to take his action and the more important is for the organization
the fact that the ’right’ action is taken in each possible circumstance, the higher are the
benefits of delegating the choice to the agent, that is of offering him a contract granting
some flexibility in his choice. On the other hand, the extent and nature of this uncertainty
also affect the costs of delegation, in a way which depends on the risk aversion of the agent,
as well as on the degree of ’ambiguity’ of such uncertainty and the attitude towards it
exhibited by the agent. When this cost is sufficiently high it might be preferable to opt
for a different type of contract, which does not delegate the action choice to the agent.
The issue is important as this trade-off naturally arises when the architecture of orga-
nizations is evaluated. The main focus of this paper is on the analysis of this trade-off,
and in particular of how the cost of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents
varies with the structure of the uncertainty and the agents’ attitude towards risk and
uncertainty.
Model and results. To this end, we will consider a simple contracting situation
between a principal and an agent. The agent must take a costly action which generates
some revenue for the principal. Before taking his action, but after signing the contract, the
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agent receives a private signal over the productivity of the various actions. More precisely,
we assume the agent privately learns the realization of a variable which, together with
the action chosen by the agent, affects the probability of the different realizations of the
principal’s revenue. The action chosen by the agent is not observable by the principal but
we suppose that, at the time of contracting, the principal has the ability to predefine the
set of actions, or possible tasks, available to the agent. Thus the principal could specify
a determinate action that the agent must undertake in all the possible circumstances he
may have to act - what we will call a rigid, or non discretionary, contract. Alternatively,
the principal could leave the agent some discretion in his behavior, so that the action the
agent undertakes may vary with the information received - a flexible contract.
Also, the cost for the agent of undertaking the various actions is deterministic. Hence
in the absence of monetary transfers contingent on the realization of the principal’s revenue
the interests of the principal and the agent are not aligned as the latter would always
choose the least costly action among the ones available to him. A flexible contract must
then include a suitably designed compensation scheme, which might also vary with the
agent’s report over the signal received, so as to induce him to take the revenue maximizing
action for each realization of the signal. But such variability in the compensation generates
possible agency costs. In contrast, a rigid contract is simpler, does not need to rely on
high-powered incentives and never incurs any agency cost.
Consider first the case where principal and agent have common and sharp probabilistic
beliefs over the possible events in which the agent will have to act. In this environment, if
the agent is risk neutral1, agency costs are zero and the optimal flexible contract always
dominates, at least weakly, the rigid contract. This is no longer true if the agent is risk
averse, as agency costs are positive in that case. We characterize the optimal flexible
contract when the agent has CARA preferences so as to be able to isolate the effects of
changes in the agent’s risk aversion. We find that at the optimal flexible contract the
agent’s compensation also depends on the agent’s report over the signal received and that
the agent’s utility is not equalized across different realizations of the signal.
Also, an increase in the agent’s degree of (absolute) risk aversion implies a larger
agency cost, and hence a lower profitability for the principal of the optimal flexible contract
relative to the rigid contracts. Thus, there is a threshold level for the agent’s degree of
risk aversion, above which a rigid contract always dominates the flexible one and below
which the reverse is true. On the other hand, the effects of increasing risk aversion on the
form of the incentive contract, for instance on the variability in the compensation paid
to the agent across different realizations of the output, prove more sensitive to changes
1We assume the principal is always risk neutral.
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in the parameters of the environment. The benefits of the flexible contract are then
larger the greater is the variance of the productivity of the various actions the agent may
undertake across the different realizations of the signal, that is the greater the relevance
of the information received by the agent.
We turn then our attention to situations where the information available to the parties
concerning the possible events in which the agent will have to act is not precise enough
to pin down a single probability distribution. This might be for instance because the
circumstances under which the agent finds himself to operate are totally new, with almost
no information available. Or it might capture the fact that these events are hard to
describe precisely in full details. We model this fact by assuming that principal and agent
have a common set of probabilistic beliefs over the likelihood of these events and allowing
them to have possibly different degrees of imprecision aversion.2 We actually assume the
Principal is imprecision neutral while the Agent is imprecision averse. To contrast this
with the situation under risk aversion, we assume both parties are risk neutral and show
that imprecision aversion by itself creates an agency cost. We provide then a partial
characterization of the optimal flexible contract under imprecision aversion, showing the
properties of the optimal flexible contract in this case are different from those obtained
under risk aversion. We also show that increasing the agent’s imprecision aversion reduces
the profits at the optimal flexible contract, making so the rigid contract more attractive.
Even though, with multiple priors the compensation contract may be designed in such
a way that principal and agent end up “using different beliefs”, and hence possibly engage
in mutually beneficial speculative trade, we show this is never optimal. This stands in
contrast with the case in which both principal and agent have sharp, but different prior
beliefs, where the surplus generated by the contractual relationship is actually enhanced
by the possibility of exploiting the benefits of speculative trade (as in Eliaz and Spiegler
(2007)).
Literature.
The choice in organizations between flexible and rigid contracts has been examined
in various other papers. Most of them however focused on the case where, in contrast
to the setup considered here, monetary transfers are not allowed and the objectives of
principal and agent are at least partly aligned. In such environments the agent may be
willing to freely transmit some of his private information to the principal. Dessein (2002)
investigates the trade-off between contracts where the choice of the action is delegated to
the agent and contracts where the principal retains the control over such choice, but uses
2We follow here the model of Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008).
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the information that is reported to him by the agent. He examines in particular how such
trade-off varies with the degree of congruence between the objectives of the principal and
the agent. Both Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Szalay (2005) study the consequences of
delegating to the agent - possibly only in part - control over the action choice on the same
agent’s incentives to invest in acquiring information.
Probably the closest paper to ours in this literature is Prendergast (2002). He considers
an environment where, like in ours, monetary transfers are allowed, the structure of
information is given and the agent has superior information. He also examines how the
relative benefits of flexible and rigid contracts vary, but with respect to the magnitude
of the uncertainty facing the agent, that is the variability in the possible situations in
which he may find himself to act. Prendergast considers the case where the agent is risk
neutral and agency costs are exogenously given (as fixed ’monitoring costs’). On the other
hand our main focus here, as argued above, is on the endogenous determination of such
costs and the analysis of how they vary with the agent’s attitude to uncertainty and the
precision of the information of principal and agent concerning the uncertainty they face
in the contractual design.
A rather different characterization of the trade-off between rigidity and flexibility is
provided by Hart and Moore (2008), where the main cost of delegation lies in the variabil-
ity of the outcome prescribed by the contract and the deadweight losses this generates.
The effects of ambiguity or imprecision in the probabilistic beliefs concerning the
possible realizations of the environment faced by parties in contractual situations have
been first examined by Mukerji (1998) and Ghirardato (1994). Mukerji (1998) studies
a vertical relationship problem, using the Choquet expected utility model of Schmeidler
(1989). He shows that, as a result of ambiguity aversion, the optimal contract might be
incomplete and, differently from our setup, exhibit low powered incentives. Ghirardato
(1994) looks at a standard moral hazard problem but where parties’ “beliefs” are non-
additive, reflecting uncertainty aversion: each action taken by the agent induces a non-
additive distribution on outcomes. His results are not directly comparable with ours, in
particular because of the use of different underlying decision models. He can show in some
very particular case that a decrease in the degree of non additivity (i.e., of imprecision in
our setup) will not decrease the principal’s profits.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the environment while
Section 3 presents the contracting problem, studies its solution and characterizes it. Sec-
tion 4 then studies the trade-off between flexible and rigid contracts, how the choice of
delegation varies with different features of the environment, in particular the agent’s at-
5
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.72 (Version révisée)
titude towards risk. In the final section we consider the situation where the parties do
not have sharp probability beliefs and investigate how the agent’s degree of ambiguity
aversion affects the choice between flexible and rigid contracts.
2 The set-up
We consider a contractual relationship between a principal, say a firm, and an agent, say
a worker. The worker has two possible actions, x and y. The output generated by each
action is uncertain: it can be either high (R¯) or low (R). The probability of the different
output realizations when action x (resp. y) is undertaken is also uncertain and depends
on some event θ ∈ {θ1, θ2}: it is pi(x, θ) (resp. pi(y, θ)) for R = R¯.
The realization of the output is publicly observable while the action chosen by the
agent is only privately known by him. Furthermore the realization of θ, describing possible
events affecting the execution/profitability of the different possible actions, is privately
observed by the agent before his action is chosen, not by the principal (nor by any third
party). To begin with, we examine the case where both principal and agent have sufficient
information over the generating process of this uncertainty to come up with a sharp
probabilistic belief over it: let p denote their common belief concerning the occurrence of
θ1.
The contract is written before the realization of any source of uncertainty (i.e., before
the output and θ are realized). Although the action undertaken by the agent is not
observable, we assume that, at the time the contract is signed, the principal can impose
some restrictions over the set of actions available to the agent.3 To understand the nature
of these restrictions we can think, for instance, of a situation where the principal can
decide to install either only one software on the agent’s computer (in which case only one
action is available to the agent) or different types of software. In the latter case the agent
is free to choose which software to use (x or y) to perform the task and his actual choice
is not observable. Also, the fact that such restrictions can only be imposed ex ante can
be justified if we think of situations where the timing of the resolution of the uncertainty
over θ, and hence of the action choice, is also uncertain and privately observed.
In this framework, therefore a compensation contract is a specification of a set of ad-
missible actions A ⊆ {x, y} together with a wage payment w from the principal to the
agent, where w can depend on the realized level of the output and the agent’s announce-
3The possibility of imposing such restrictions was earlier considered in various papers starting with
Holmstrom (1984) (see Alonso and Matouschek (2008), Armstrong and Vickers (2009) for some recent
contributions). This was however typically in the absence of monetary transfers. In addition, in this
literature the action is typically observable.
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ment about the realization of the event θ. Let w¯i (resp. wi) denote the compensation paid
to the agent when the output is R¯ (resp. R) and the (declared) state is θi, i = 1, 2.
In particular, we would like to distinguish the case where the full menu of possible
actions is available to the agent, A = {x, y} , from the cases where only action x - or
only action y - is available to the agent. We refer to the contract in the first case as a
flexible contract, since the agent has the flexibility and the discretion to choose the action
he thinks is more appropriate for him (and suitable incentives should be specified in the
contract to induce the agent to make a choice also in the principal’s interest). In the
second case we say on the other hand the contract is rigid, as it prescribes the agent to
always undertake a given action. The contract can then be of type x or of type y according
to which action is specified.
The time-line is then as follows:
t = 0 The contract is signed, specifying the payments due to the agent for each possible
realization of the output and each announcement of the agent regarding θ. In
addition, the contract specifies the set A ⊆ {x, y} of possible actions available to
the agent.
t = 1 θ is observed by the agent who announces then its value to the principal.
t = 2 The agent undertakes an action z ∈ A, not observable by the principal.
t = 3 Output is revealed (i.e., uncertainty about output is resolved and output is observed)
t = 4 Compensation is paid to the agent, according to the realized output level and the
agent’s announcement.
Observe that at the time in which the contract is signed there is symmetric information
among the parties, the agent does not know the realization of the uncertainty. Asymmetric
information will arise at a later stage, when the agent learns some information about the
profitability of the different actions, and chooses then which action to take.
Remark 1 We ignore here the possibility of renegotiation, in particular at the time in
which the realization of θ is learnt by the agent (t = 1).
The principal is the residual claimant of the output and is risk neutral. His payoff,
when action zi, i = 1, 2, is implemented in state θi, is then given by the expected profit:
p[pi(z1, θ1)(R¯− w¯1) + (1− pi(z1, θ1))(R− w1)]
+(1− p)[pi(z2, θ2)(R¯− w¯2) + (1− pi(z2, θ2))(R− w2)]
7
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The agent has a non separable4 utility function over the compensation received and
the cost cz of undertaking the action z ∈ {x, y} that is chosen. In particular, in most of
the paper we will assume the agent is risk averse and exhibits the following preferences:
Assumption 1 The agent has a CARA utility function: u(w, z) = −e
−a(w−cz )
a
, with a > 0.
The agent’s risk attitude is so described by the single parameter a. It is then convenient
to renormalize the agent’s reservation utility as −e
−au¯
a
.
Our main goal is to investigate in this set-up the relative profitability of flexible and
rigid contracts. While the flexible contract offers the agent the opportunity to choose
the best action in each possible contingency, delegating the choice to the agent creates
an agency problem, since the action is not observable. Hence the wage schedule has to
satisfy a set of appropriate incentive compatibility constraints. On the other hand, in a
rigid contract no agency problem arises, since the agent has no discretion, but the action
implemented cannot be adjusted to the different contingencies.
We will also assume:
Assumption 2
i) cx > cy, i.e., ∆c ≡ cx − cy > 0,
ii) pi(x, θ1) > pi(x, θ2) > pi(y, θ2) > pi(y, θ1),
iii) (pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ1))(R¯− R) > ∆c > (pi(x, θ2)− pi(y, θ2))(R¯− R),
iv) 1−pi(y,θ1)
1−pi(x,θ1)
≥ ea∆c.
Conditions i) and ii) say that action x is both more costly and more productive than
action y. At the same time, the additional productivity of action x, relative to action
y, is uncertain: it is larger in state θ1 than in state θ2.
5 Condition iii) then says that
this variability in the productivity differential is sufficiently significant that in state θ1
the expected revenue net of the cost is higher for action x and in state θ2 it is higher for
action y. Hence conditions i-iii) ensure that, if there were no agency problems (that is, if
4A utility function that is non separable in the wage received and the cost incurred allows us to study
the comparative statics properties of the optimal contract with respect to the agent’s level of risk aversion
- one of our objectives. With such a specification in fact the rate of substitution between actions and wage
payments is constant and changes in the curvature of the agent’s utility function only capture changes in
the agent’s attitude towards risk in his compensation.
5Condition ii) specifies one such configuration. An alternative specification which may also exhibit
this property is pi(x, θ1) > pi(x, θ2) > pi(y, θ1) > pi(y, θ2); its effects for the form of the optimal contracts
are discussed below in footnote 6.
8
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both θ and the agent’s action were publicly observed), the optimal contract would be a
flexible one, implementing action x in θ1 and y in θ2.
Finally, condition iv) says that in state θ1 the productivity differential of action x
relative to y is sufficiently large, relative to the utility cost of effort. It ensures, as we
will see, that the agency costs are not too high and hence that the profile of actions x in
θ1 and y in θ2 is implementable even when the state θ and the agent’s actions are only
privately observed.
3 Contracts
3.1 Optimal flexible contract
The advantage of a flexible contract over a rigid one is that it allows to implement the
action profile maximizing net revenue that, under Assumption 2, is given by action x in
θ1 and y in θ2. The cost is that, to implement such action profile, appropriate incentive
constraints need to be imposed, ensuring that no possible deviation, in the action choice
and/or the reporting over the state, is profitable. The optimal contract implementing
this action profile subject to the incentive constraints (to which we will refer, with a
slight abuse of terminology, as the optimal flexible contract) is obtained as solution of the
following programme:
maxw¯1,w1,w¯2,w2 p[pi(x, θ1)(R¯ − w¯1) + (1− pi(x, θ1))(R − w1)]
+(1− p)[pi(y, θ2)(R¯ − w¯2) + (1− pi(y, θ2))(R − w2)]
s.t.

(IC1) − pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯1−cx) − (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w1−cx) ≥ −pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯2−cx) − (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w2−cx)
(IC2) − pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯1−cx) − (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w1−cx) ≥ −pi(y, θ1)e
−a(w¯1−cy) − (1− pi(y, θ1))e
−a(w1−cy)
(IC3) − pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯1−cx) − (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w1−cx) ≥ −pi(y, θ1)e
−a(w¯2−cy) − (1− pi(y, θ1))e
−a(w2−cy)
(IC4) − pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cy) − (1− pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w2−cy) ≥ −pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯1−cy) − (1− pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w1−cy)
(IC5) − pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cy) − (1− pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w2−cy) ≥ −pi(x, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cx) − (1− pi(x, θ2))e
−a(w2−cx)
(IC6) − pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cy) − (1− pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w2−cy) ≥ −pi(x, θ2)e
−a(w¯1−cx) − (1− pi(x, θ2))e
−a(w1−cx)
(PC) − p[pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯1−cx) + (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w1−cx)]−
(1− p)[pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cy) + (1− pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w2−cy)] ≥ −e−au¯
(P flex)
where incentive constraints (IC1),(IC2) and (IC3) ensure that, in state θ1, the agent does
not want to deviate by, respectively, misreporting the state, changing the action, or doing
both. Incentive constraints (IC4), (IC5) and (IC6) ensure the same properties hold in
state θ2. (PC) is then the participation constraint.
9
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We show in the next proposition that, at a solution of the above problem, only con-
straints (IC3), (IC4) and (PC) bind and we also derive some properties of the optimal
compensation scheme of the agent.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a flexible contract implementing
action x in θ1 and y in θ2. The optimal contract implementing such a profile is obtained
as solution of the following simplified problem:
maxw¯1,w1,w¯2,w2 p[pi(x, θ1)(R¯− w¯1) + (1− pi(x, θ1))(R− w1)]
+(1− p)[pi(y, θ2)(R¯− w¯2) + (1− pi(y, θ2))(R− w2)]
s.t. (IC3), (IC4), (PC) holding as equalities and w¯1 ≥ w¯2, w¯2 ≥ w2
and exhibits the following properties:
w¯1 ≥ w¯2 > w2 ≥ w1.
Recall that (IC3) refers to the “joint deviation” in state θ1 (i.e., announcing instead
the state is θ2 and choosing action y rather than x), while (IC4) only concerns the mis-
reporting deviation in state θ2 of announcing θ1.
Let u(θ1) = −pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯1−cx) − (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w1−cx) denote the agent’s expected
utility at the optimal contract when state θ1 occurs; similarly, u(θ2) = −pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cy)−
(1 − pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w2−cy) is the utility when θ2 occurs. The properties shown in the above
proposition that (IC3) is binding at an optimum and that w¯2 > w2, together with the
fact that pi(y, θ1) < pi(y, θ2), have the following important implication:
Corollary 1 At the optimal flexible contract, u(θ2) > u(θ1).
Thus even though the less costly action y is implemented in state θ2 the optimal
contract is characterized in that state by a wage that varies with the output realizations.
At the same time, the expected utility of the net compensation paid to the manager is
higher in state θ2 than in θ1. The variability in w2 and the lack of smoothing in the
agent’s utility levels across the realizations of θ can both be justified as a way to reduce
the variability in the compensation paid in θ1: it can in fact be verified that (IC3), (IC4)
and (PC) can all be satisfied as equality even with a constant level of w2 - and hence with
the same utility levels for the agent in state θ2 as in θ1 - but this is suboptimal.
Remark 2 To further understand the determinants of these properties of the optimal
flexible contract, it is useful to compare them with those of the optimal contract (still
implementing action x in state θ1 and y in θ2) obtained when the realization of θ is publicly
10
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observable while the action is not. We can show6 that in such case w¯2 = w2 w¯1 > w1,
and the agent’s expected utility is the same in state θ1 as in θ2. Thus the variability in w2
and in the agent’s utility levels we found in the optimal flexible contract (Proposition 1)
is due to the need of addressing the additional incentive problems arising from the agent’s
private information over θ. A lower variability in w2 could only be achieved, as we already
argued, at the cost of a higher variability of w1.
3.2 Rigid contracts
The optimal rigid contract implementing a constant action z, z = x, y, in every state is
obtained as a solution of the following programme (note that the only constraint is given
by (PC), no incentive compatibility constraint appears here as the agent has no discretion
over the choice of his action):
maxw¯1,w1,w¯2,w2 p[pi(z, θ1)(R¯− w¯1) + (1− pi(z, θ1))(R− w1)]
+(1− p)[pi(z, θ2)(R¯− w¯2) + (1− pi(z, θ2))(R− w2)]
(PC) p[pi(z, θ1)e
−a(w¯1−cz) + (1− pi(z, θ1))e
−a(w1−cz)]+
(1− p)[pi(z, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cz) + (1− pi(z, θ2))e
−a(w2−cz)] = e−au¯
(P rig)
Its solution is very simple in the present framework: the wage should be constant
(w¯1 = w1 = w¯2 = w2 = wz), at the level determined by the participation constraint, thus
equal to the expected cost of undertaking action z. In particular:
i) Fixed x contract: the compensation is wx = u¯+ cx, and expected profits are:
[ppi(x, θ1) + (1− p)pi(x, θ2)]R¯ + [p(1− pi(x, θ1)) + (1− p)(1− pi(x, θ2))]R− u¯− cx
ii) Fixed y contract: the compensation is wy = u¯+ cy, and profits are:
[ppi(y, θ1) + (1− p)pi(y, θ2)]R¯ + [p(1− pi(y, θ1)) + (1− p)(1− pi(y, θ2))]R− u¯− cy
6 When θ is observable the only incentive constraints which need to be considered are (IC2), (IC4), the
problem is thus clearly simpler and an explicit solution for the optimal compensation scheme can be de-
rived. Interestingly, this turns out to be the same as the optimal contract we obtain when θ is not observ-
able but pi(y, θ1) > pi(y, θ2) (see Appendix B, available online at http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Gottardi/
for a formal derivation).
11
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.72 (Version révisée)
4 The choice between flexible and rigid contracts
We are now ready to compare the expected profits of the principal at the optimal flexible
contract, characterized in Proposition 1, with the expected profits at the rigid contracts
specified in the previous section. We can then determine which type of contract is prefer-
able. In particular, we intend to analyze how the superiority of the flexible or of the
rigid contractual arrangement depends on various parameters of the environment (the
agent’s preferences, and in particular his risk attitude, the costs of undertaking the dif-
ferent actions, their probabilities of success, describing both the relative productivity of
each action and the relevance of the uncertainty affecting it).
As we said in the previous section, in the optimal flexible contract the agent’s action
can be adjusted to reflect the different circumstances under which the agent may find
himself to operate. However there is also an agency cost in delegating the choice of the
action to the agent since the action and the state are not observable and the agent’s
objectives are not aligned to those of the principal. We should expect therefore that the
advantages of flexibility will be higher the bigger is the difference between the relative
productivity of the two types of actions in state θ1 and in the other state θ2 as well as the
smaller is the ’agency cost’ which has to be paid to implement the action profile x, y.
4.1 The effect of risk aversion
An important determinant of the agency costs of implementing a variable action profile
and hence of the trade-off between flexible and rigid contracts is given by the agent’s
risk attitude (described, in the case of CARA preferences, by the single parameter a).
As shown above, the compensation paid at the rigid contracts is a deterministic amount,
independent of the agent’s degree of risk aversion. In contrast, at the optimal flexible
contract where a variable action profile is implemented, the compensation varies both
with θ and the output realizations, and hence the degree of risk aversion matters.
To see the consequences of the agent’s risk attitude it is useful to consider first the
extreme case where the agent is risk neutral, like the principal. In that case, agency costs
are zero as the first best can be implemented, that is the principal can attain the same
level of profits as when all incentive compatibility constraints are ignored.
Proposition 2 When the agent is risk neutral the optimal flexible contract is first best
optimal. The expected level of profits is p[pi(x, θ1)R¯+(1−pi(x, θ1))R]+(1−p)[pi(y, θ2)R¯+
12
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(1− pi(y, θ2))R]− u¯− pcx − (1− p)cy and an optimal compensation
7 is given by
w¯1 = u¯+ cx +
1− pi(x, θ1)
pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ2)
∆c (1)
w1 = u¯+ cx −
pi(x, θ1)
pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ2)
∆c
w¯2 = w2 = u¯+ cy
Recall that, by Assumption 2(iii), the expected revenue net of the cost is highest with
the profile of actions x in state θ1 and y in θ2. Since under risk neutrality there are no
agency costs and the first best is attainable, it follows that in this case the optimal flexible
contract is always preferable to the rigid ones.
On the other hand, when the agent is risk averse (a > 0) agency costs are positive, as
in order to satisfy the incentive constraints a risk premium must be paid and hence the
principal’s profits have to be reduced from their first best level. This clearly implies the
flexible contract may no longer dominate the rigid contracts.
Note first that Assumption 2(iv) imposes an upper bound on a. For values of a higher
than this bound the variable action profile (x, y) is no longer implementable, in which
case there is no tradeoff between rigid and flexible contract, and the rigid ones are then
always preferable.
Besides the comparison of the extreme values of a = 0 and a sufficiently high, where the
outcome is clear, we are also interested here in analysing the effects of smaller changes in a,
possibly infinitesimal ones, on the relative profitability of flexible and rigid contracts. To
this end we need to consider the effects of local changes in risk aversion for the properties
of optimal incentive contracts. They prove to be rather complex and no analytic result can
be established.8 Hence in the analysis below we rely on the consideration of a numerical
example, for which the optimal payment schedule can be solved numerically. The results
obtained prove to be robust to changes in the parameter values chosen.
The parameters describing the environment exhibit the following values:
a p u¯ R¯ R cx cy pi(x, θ1) pi(x, θ2) pi(y, θ1) pi(y, θ2)
1 .5 1 10 5 1.5 1 .8 .45 .2 .4
Table 1: Parameter values for the comparative static exercise
7Note that this compensation scheme yields u(θ2) = u(θ1).
8It is easy to see that the analysis in Jewitt (1987) is not applicable to the problem under consideration
here. The difficulties faced in the comparative statics analysis with respect to risk aversion were also
emphasized by Jullien, Salanie´ and Salanie´ (1999).
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We provide in what follows a characterization of the comparative statics effects of
varying the agent’s degree of risk aversion a. Figure 1 shows how the difference between
the expected profits at the optimal flexible contract and the two rigid contracts changes
with a. We see this relationship is monotonically decreasing. For low levels of risk aversion,
the flexible contract is preferable to the two rigid contracts, but as a increases the profit
differential becomes progressively smaller and eventually, from a ∼ 1.6 onwards in the
situation considered, the rigid contract specifying task x for the agent becomes optimal.
This pattern appears to be robust to changes in the value of the other parameters and
shows that agency costs are increasing with the agent’s risk aversion9. Hence we can say
that agency costs are increasing and the advantages of delegation decreasing in the agent’s
degree of risk aversion.
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Figure 1: Profit differential between the flexible and rigid contracts as a function of risk
aversion
The next two figures illustrate then the implications of the level of the agent’s degree
of risk aversion for the specific properties of the optimal flexible contract. In particular,
Figure 2 describes the effect of varying a on the spread between the compensation paid
for the high and low output realizations at the optimal flexible contract respectively in
state θ1 (i.e. w¯1−w1) and θ2. It shows that the spread in state θ1 is first decreasing
and then increasing in a while the spread in θ2 is always increasing in a. Figure 3 shows
that the utility differential also varies non monotonically with a, first increasing and then
decreasing. We should point out however that the properties found in Figures 2 and 3,
9A similar pattern also obtains when the realization of θ is commonly observed: increasing risk aversion
makes the rigid contracts more attractive relative to the flexible ones. The profits of the flexible contract
when θ is observable are strictly higher than when θ is only privately observed, and we find the difference
is increasing in risk aversion.
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unlike those of Figure 1, are not quite robust to changes in the values of the parameters
considered in Table 110.
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Figure 2: Wage differentials at the optimal flexible contract as a function of risk aversion
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Figure 3: Utility differential u(θ2) − u(θ1) at the optimal flexible contract as a function
of a
Trying to disentangle the various effects of risk aversion, we can first observe that
increasing a makes the participation constraint, ceteris paribus, harder to satisfy: such
constraint requires that the certainty equivalent of the lottery with outcomes w¯1−cx,w1−
cx, w¯2 − cy, w2 − cy is equal to u¯, but the certainty equivalent of this lottery decreases
with risk aversion.
10Even when θ is observable we find for instance that the spread of the compensation paid in state θ1
can be non monotonic or monotonically decreasing depending on the values of the parameters.
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Each of the two incentive constraints which are binding at an optimum solution, (IC3)
and (IC4), then requires a pair of distinct lotteries to have the same expected utility. In
the case of (IC3) we cannot rank the two lotteries that are compared in terms of riskiness,
(w¯1 − cx,w1 − cx), with probabilities pi(x, θ1), 1 − pi(x, θ1), and (w¯2 − cy,w2 − cy), with
probabilities pi(y, θ1), 1− pi(y, θ1)). We know in fact that w1 − cx is the smallest outcome
but we do not know, for instance, how to rank w¯1 − cx versus w¯2 − cy. Furthermore, the
attached probabilities are not the same. Thus, the effect of changing risk aversion on this
constraint is ambiguous. On the other hand, for (IC4) we can say that the second of the
two lotteries compared is always riskier than the first one. Hence increasing risk aversion
loosens this constraint: i.e., if a is increased while the compensation is kept constant, the
constraint becomes slack. Hence, when a increases, (PC) is harder to satisfy while (IC4)
is easier, and the effect on (IC3) is unclear.
4.2 The effect of actions’ productivity and cost
We investigate next how the relative profitability of flexible versus rigid contracts is af-
fected by the following parameters: the levels of the probability of success for each action
and event in which it is undertaken and the cost of the different types of actions cz. Our
findings, still based on the parametrization described in Table 1, are summarized in Table
2. A + (resp. -) sign indicates that an increase in the parameter value indicated in the
top of the column always increases (decreases) the variable appearing in the row, while a
? indicates the effect is ambiguous, not always of the same sign.
Parameter pi(x, θ1) pi(x, θ2) pi(y, θ1) pi(y, θ2) cx cy
Range [.75,.9] [.35,.55] [.15,.25] [.3,.5] [1.2,1.8] [.7,1.25]
Profit flexible - profit x + − − + ? ?
Profit flexible - profit y + = − − − +
w¯1 − w1 − = + ? + −
w¯2 − w2 − = − + + −
u(θ2)− u(θ1) − = − + + −
Table 2: Comparative statics with respect to probabilities and costs
For instance, the first column reports the sign of the effects of increasing pi(x, θ1),
within the interval indicated, [.75, .9] on the following variables: (i) the differential between
the expected profits at the optimal flexible contract and those at the x rigid contract in
the first row and at the y one in the second row; (ii) the spread between the compensation
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paid for the high and low realization of the output when state θ1 occurs in the third row
and when θ2 occurs in the fourth one; (iii) the difference in expected utility in the two
states. All this when the other parameters are kept fixed at the values indicated in Table
1.
In particular, we find that the profitability of the flexible contract, relative to both
rigid contracts, increases if pi(x, θ1) (probability of success with action x in state 1)
increases, or pi(y, θ1) decreases. Such changes increase the productivity of the costlier
action (x) relative to the less costly one in state θ1 as well as (in the first case) relative to
state θ2. The same effects are obtained with a decrease in pi(x, θ2), reducing the difference
between the productivity of actions x and y in state θ2. On the other hand, a change in
pi(y, θ2) has opposite effects on the profitability of the flexible contract relative to the two
rigid ones, while the effect of increasing the costs cx and cy of the two actions on the same
profit difference is non monotonic.
We also see that the variability in the compensation paid in state θ2, where the less
costly action is implemented, always moves in the same direction as the utility differential
u(θ2)−u(θ1), suggesting these two are complementary instruments to address the incentive
problems generated by the private information over θ, as already mentioned in Remark
2.
5 The choice of delegation with ambiguity
We examine now the case where, at the time in which the contract is written, the in-
formation available to the parties concerning the likelihood of the various events is not
precise enough for them to have a sharp probability belief. This appears rather natural
in many instances, where the situation faced by the parties is sufficiently new that past
data cannot be used to pin down probabilities.
We thus assume in this section that there is a set of probability distributions over
{θ1, θ2}, which is described by an interval of values for the probability of θ1 occurring,
p ∈ [p, p¯]. This set represents the probability beliefs consistent with the available infor-
mation (precise information corresponds to a singleton set, p = p¯, so there is only one
probability distribution compatible with the available information). Similarly, there is a
set of possible probabilities of R¯ occurring, conditionally on action x and state θ1 given
by the interval [pi(x, θ1), p¯i(x, θ1)], another set for the beliefs conditionally on action y and
state θ2, given by the interval [pi(y, θ2), p¯i(y, θ2)], conditionally on action y and state θ1
given by the set [pi(y, θ1), p¯i(y, θ1)] and conditionally on action x in state θ2, given by the
set [pi(x, θ2), p¯i(x, θ2)].
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We need a tractable model of decision under uncertainty in such situations, that allows
for a simple parametrization of individuals’ attitude towards uncertainty, and in particular
of their ambiguity (or imprecision as we will call it) aversion. We use the model developed
by Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, Vergnaud (2008), to which we refer the reader for further
details. In the case of interest here, this model is particularly simple. The criterion
consists in taking a convex combination of the minimal expected utility (with respect to
all possible distributions in the specified intervals) and the expected utility with respect
to a central probability (the center of the interval). The weight α placed on the minimal
expected utility in this combination reflects the decision maker’s imprecision aversion.
The case α = 0 reflects imprecision neutrality: the decision maker acts as if he were an
expected utility maximizer with respect to the central probability in each interval, while
α = 1 reflects extreme imprecision aversion, the decision maker putting all the weight on
the least favorable prior.11
In this section we assume that both parties are risk neutral. We furthermore as-
sume that the Principal is imprecision neutral. He therefore acts as an expected profit
maximizer, with respect to the central probability. The Agent, on the other hand, is
characterized by his degree α of imprecision aversion. Variables with ˆ represent the
“central probabilities”, i.e., pˆ =
p+p¯
2
, pˆi(x, θ1) =
pi(x,θ1)+p¯i(x,θ1)
2
and so on.
The Principal’s objective function – when implementing the flexible contract – is then
simply to maximize
pˆ[pˆi(x, θ1)(R¯−w¯1)+(1−pˆi(x, θ1))(R−w1)]+(1−pˆ)[pˆi(y, θ2)(R¯−w¯2)+(1−pˆi(y, θ2))(R−w2)]
Let’s now consider the Agent’s incentive constraints. His utility in state θ1 when action
x is exerted is given by
α min
pi(x,θ1)∈[pi(x,θ1),p¯i(x,θ1)]
{pi(x, θ1)w¯1 + (1− pi(x, θ1))w1}+(1−α) [pˆi(x, θ1)w¯1 + (1− pˆi(x, θ1))w1]
This can also be expressed as
min
pi∈[pˆi(x,θ1)−α(x,θ1),pˆi(x,θ1)+α(x,θ1)]
{piw¯1 + (1− pi)w1} ,
where α(x, θ1) = α
p¯i(x,θ1)−pi(x,θ1)
2
.
11This criterion, as we see clarly from the expression of the agents’ utility functions in what follows,
belongs to the general class of multiple priors models due to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). One important
difference is that, here, information is made explicit, in the form of sets of probability distributions. This
allows one to define a measure of imprecision aversion, something that is not possible in the original
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
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To simplify notation, denote I(x, θ1) the interval [pˆi(x, θ1)−α(x, θ1), pˆi(x, θ1)+α(x, θ1)].
Using similar notation for action y in state θ2, and action y in state θ1, the incentive
constraints, analogous to those in (P flex), take the following expressions:

(IC1∗) minpi∈I(x,θ1)[piw¯1 + (1− pi)w1] ≥ minpi∈I(x,θ1)[piw¯2 + (1− pi)w2]
(IC2∗) minpi∈I(x,θ1)[piw¯1 + (1− pi)w1]− cx ≥ minpi∈I(y,θ1)[piw¯1 + (1− pi)w1]− cy
(IC3∗) minpi∈I(x,θ1)[piw¯1 + (1− pi)w1]− cx ≥ minpi∈I(y,θ1)[piw¯2 + (1− pi)w2]− cy
(IC4∗) minpi∈I(y,θ2)[piw¯2 + (1− pi)w2] ≥ minpi∈I(y,θ2)[piw¯1 + (1− pi)w1]
(IC5∗) minpi∈I(y,θ2)[piw¯2 + (1− pi)w2]− cy ≥ minpi∈I(x,θ2)[piw¯2 + (1− pi)w2]− cx
(IC6∗) minpi∈I(y,θ2)[piw¯2 + (1− pi)w2]− cy ≥ minpi∈I(x,θ2)[piw¯1 + (1− pi)w1]− cx
(2)
The participation constraint takes then the following form (PC∗):
min
p∈[pˆ−α(p),pˆ+α(p)]
{
p min
pi∈I(x,θ1)
[piw¯1 + (1− pi)w1]− cx + (1− p) min
pi∈I(y,θ2)
[piw¯2 + (1− pi)w2]− cy]
}
≥ u¯
where α(p) = α
p¯−p
2
.
Finally, it is convenient, in order to make a comparison with the previous analysis, to
reformulate Assumption 2(ii) in the present framework as follows:
for all pi(x, θ1) ∈ I(x, θ1), pi(x, θ2) ∈ I(x, θ2), pi(y, θ2) ∈ I(y, θ2), pi(y, θ1) ∈ I(y, θ1),
we have pi(x, θ1) > pi(x, θ2) > pi(y, θ2) > pi(y, θ1)
This ensures that there is no overlap in the (induced) probability intervals, and thus
that the induced beliefs (no matter what they are) respect the ordering we imposed in
the previous sections when these beliefs were assumed to be precise, single probability
distributions. Note the one above is a joint assumption on α, the imprecision aversion
of the Agent, and the “amount of imprecision”, captured by the width of the probability
intervals.
5.1 Existence of an agency cost
Let us start from the full insurance contract, that is the optimal contract absent any
informational asymmetries. This contract insures the worker within each state θ as well
as across states. It has w¯1 = w1 = u¯+ cx and w¯2 = w2 = u¯+ cy. We show now that any
deviation from this contract that satisfies the participation constraint, (weakly) decreases
the Principal’s profits.
For instance, perturb the full insurance contract in the following way: dw¯1 > 0,
dw1 < 0, dw¯2 > 0 and dw2 < 0 so that
(pˆi(y, θ2)−α(y, θ2))dw¯2+(1−pˆi(y, θ2)+α(y, θ2))dw2 > (pˆi(x, θ1)−α(x, θ1))dw¯1+(1−pˆi(x, θ1)+α(x, θ1))dw1
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i.e., the Agent is now better off in state θ2 than in θ1. As a consequence, the Agent
now evaluates the occurrence of θ1 with the least favorable distribution, i.e., pˆ + α(p).
Similarly, he uses pˆi(x, θ1) − α(x, θ1) to evaluate, within state θ1, the probability of R¯,
conditionally on doing action x, and pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2) to evaluate, within state θ2 the
probability of R¯, conditionally on doing action y.
The change in expected cost for the Principal is equal to
pˆ[pˆi(x, θ1)dw¯1 + (1− pˆi(x, θ1))dw1] + (pˆi(y, θ2)dw¯2 + (1− pˆi(y, θ2))dw2,
and we show it is non negative if the participation constraint has to be satisfied. The
effect of this change in compensation on the Agent’s participation constraint is in fact
(pˆ+ α(p)) {(pˆi(x, θ1)− α(x, θ1))dw¯1 + (1− pˆi(x, θ1) + α(x, θ1))dw1}+
(1− pˆ− α(p)) {(pˆi(y, θ2)− α(y, θ2))dw¯2 + (1− pˆi(y, θ2) + α(y, θ2))dw2} ≥ 0
which can be decomposed as follows:
pˆ[pˆi(x, θ1)dw¯1 + (1− pˆi(x, θ1))dw1] + (1− pˆ)[pˆi(y, θ2)dw¯2 + (1− pˆi(y, θ2))dw2]+
pˆα(x, θ1)(dw1 − dw¯1) + (1− pˆ)α(y, θ2)(dw2 − dw¯2)+
α(p)[(pˆi(x, θ1)− α(x, θ1))dw¯1 + (1− pˆi(x, θ1) + α(x, θ1))dw1
− (pˆi(y, θ2)− α(y, θ2))dw¯2 − (1− pˆi(y, θ2) + α(y, θ2))dw2] ≥ 0
(3)
The term in the first line is equal to the change in cost for the Principal. The term in
the second line is negative, given the sign of the deviations. The last term is negative
since the deviation considered implies that the utility in state θ2 is higher than in state
θ1. Hence, for the participation constraint to still hold ((3) to be satisfied) it has to be
the case that costs increase for the Principal and profits decrease.12
The deviation contemplated above generates a higher utility level in state θ2 than in
θ1 as well as, in each θ state, for the high income realization. This pins down the induced
beliefs that appear in the Agent’s participation constraint. The same type of reasoning
can be applied for any other deviation from the full insurance contract – with different
induced beliefs – to show that expected costs increase. Since we know that a constant
level of wages in state θ1 violates incentive compatibility, we conclude therefore that there
exists an agency cost13. Thus the sole presence of imprecision aversion generates an agency
cost, analogously to risk aversion.
12This is true except in the special case where α(x, θ1) = α(y, θ2) = α(p) = 0, which occurs for instance
if the Agent is imprecision neutral. In this case the terms appearing in the second to the fourth line in
(3) are all zero. Hence (3) is exactly equal to the change in cost for the Principal, that is the considered
change in wages has no effect on profits, and so the first best level of welfare is still attainable.
13This cost could be zero, as we have seen in footnote 12, in some special cases.
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What this analysis also shows is that, in line with the no trade results present in
the literature on ambiguity aversion (see, e.g., Billot et al. (2000), Strzalecki and Werner
(2011)) it is never optimal to induce different beliefs between the Agent and the Principal,
unless it is required to do so in order to satisfy the incentive constraints. And in this setting
such difference in beliefs never increases the surplus to be split between the two parties.
5.2 Optimal contract
We provide here a partial characterization of the optimal flexible contract under impreci-
sion aversion and analyze then the relative profitability of flexible vs. rigid contracts.
Proposition 3 For an open set of values of parameters describing the environment, the
optimal flexible contract is given by
w¯1 = u¯+ cx +
1− pˆi(x, θ1)− α(x, θ1)
pˆi(x, θ1)− α(x, θ1)− pˆi(y, θ2) + α(y, θ2)
∆c (4)
w1 = u¯+ cx −
pˆi(x, θ1)− α(x, θ1)
pˆi(x, θ1)− α(x, θ1)− pˆi(y, θ2) + α(y, θ2)
∆c
w¯2 = w2 = u¯+ cy
Otherwise, the optimal flexible contract is characterized by w¯2 > w2 and by a lower vari-
ability of wages in state θ1.
The contract described in the above proposition is the one which we saw in Proposition
2 allows to attain the first best in the risk neutral, imprecision neutral case. Observe that,
at such contract, the incentive constraints (IC3∗) and (IC4∗) in (2) are binding, while
the others are slack. The participation constraint (PC∗) is also binding.
We outline here the argument to establish the result in Proposition 3, referring to the
Appendix for further details. We investigate whether local deviations from this contract
(dw¯1,dw1,dw¯2,dw2), satisfying (IC3
∗), (IC4∗) and (PC∗) as equality, can increase the
expected level of the Principal’s profit. To that end, we use the system given by the three
binding constraints to solve for dw¯1, dw¯2, and dw2 as a function of dw1. When dw1 is
positive, we have dw¯1 < 0, dw¯2 > 0, and dw2 < 0; the opposite signs when dw1 is negative.
Plug then the expressions obtained as in the previous paragraph for dw¯1, dw¯2, and
dw2 as a function of dw1, together with dw1, in the derivative of the profit function of
the Principal. It is immediate to verify that this derivative is always negative for the
deviation characterized by dw1 < 0, which is so not profitable for the Principal.
On the other hand, whether the deviation with dw1 > 0 is profitable or not depends
on the parameter values of the model. We can show, for instance, that when α(p) =
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α(y, θ2) = 0 while α(x, θ1) > 0 this deviation is profitable and so the considered contract
is not optimal. On the other hand, when α(x, θ1) = 0 this deviation too is not profitable
and the proposed contract is then optimal. Both properties are actually true for an open
set of parameters around the points indicated.
Recall that α(x, θ1) = α
p¯i(x,θ1)−pi(x,θ1)
2
. This term encapsulates both imprecision (as
measured by the width of the interval [pi(x, θ1), p¯i(x, θ1)]) and imprecision aversion (as
captured by the parameter α). Thus, the case α(p) = α(y, θ2) = 0 and α(x, θ1) > 0
corresponds to a situation where there is no imprecision on p, i.e., there is a known
probability of occurrence of θ1 or θ2, no imprecision regarding the probability of success in
state θ2 when y is undertaken, and on the contrary there is imprecision on the probability
of success in state θ1. In this case a reduction in the wage volatility in state θ1 (as in
the considered deviation with dw1 > 0) allows to increase profits, even though the wage
volatility in state θ2 increases. Clearly it is not possible to bring down to zero the volatility
of wages in θ1, as some variability in this state is still required to implement action x. We
conjecture that the optimal contract in this case is obtained at the point where (IC2∗)
binds.
In contrast, when α(x, θ1) = 0 there is no imprecision on the probability of success in
state θ1 when x is undertaken. In this situation, it is actually possible to attain the first
best level of profits. The three terms appearing in the second to the fourth line of (3) that
we identified as constituting the agency cost, are in fact all zero, as there is no variability
in the utility across states, nor in w2, the only variability is in w1 and α(x, θ1) = 0.
When we consider the case in which all intervals considered have equal imprecision,
that is
p¯i(x, θ1)− pi(x, θ1) = p¯i(y, θ2)− pi(y, θ2) = p¯− p ≡ β
and thus α(p) = α(y, θ2) = α(x, θ1) ≡ αβ, we get the following expression for the change
in the Principal’s profit:
αβ
(pˆi(y, θ2)− pˆi(y, θ1))(−1 + pˆi(x, θ1)− pˆi(y, θ2)) + (1− pˆ)(pˆi(x, θ1)− pˆi(y, θ1))
[pˆi(y, θ1)− pˆi(y, θ2)][(pˆ+ αβ)(pˆi(x, θ1)− αβ) + (1− pˆ− αβ)(pˆi(y, θ2)− αβ)]
It is easy to show that again this expression is positive for an open set of parameters.
The conclusion we draw from this analysis is that the optimal flexible contract under
imprecision aversion (and risk neutrality) is different from the optimal one under risk
aversion (and imprecision neutrality). In the latter it is never optimal to provide full
insurance to the Agent in state θ2 as well as across states θ1 and θ2, while this is optimal,
for an open set of parameter values, under imprecision aversion. When this configuration
is suboptimal also with imprecision aversion, the optimal flexible contract exhibits less
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volatility in state θ1, together with some volatility in state θ2 and across the θ states, as
when there is risk aversion.
Remark 3 As we have seen, imprecision aversion acts as if “inducing” different beliefs
between the Principal and the Agent. The induced beliefs depend on the feature of the
payment scheme. To better understand the role played by this heterogeneity in beliefs, it is
useful to examine the case where agents’ beliefs are fixed at this induced level. Consider in
particular the contract described in (4): the Principal uses beliefs pˆi(x, θ1) while the Agent
uses p¯i(x, θ1). On the other hand, the beliefs of the Agent over θ1 and on R¯ conditionally
on being in state θ2 and on doing action y are not pinned down and could be set equal to
those used by Principal, pˆ and pˆi(y, θ2). However when the Agent and the Principal have
exogenously fixed beliefs set at this level (p¯i(x, θ1), pˆ, pˆi(y, θ2) for the Agent and pˆi(x, θ1), pˆ,
pˆi(y, θ2) for the Principal), the contract considered is never optimal: a higher level of
expected profits can in fact be attained by reducing the volatility of the payment in the
θ1 state and increasing that in θ2 and across the θ states. This stands in stark contrast
to the imprecision aversion case, where the contract described is optimal for an open set
of parameter values. The reason is precisely because the above deviation would induce a
change in the Agent’s beliefs which would make the deviation no longer profitable.
We can then compare the optimal flexible contract to the rigid contracts. In particular
we analyze how the relative profitability of the two varies in this case with respect to the
parameters describing the imprecision (that is, the intervals of possible probability levels)
and the imprecision aversion (α).
Corollary 2 When the optimal flexible contract is the one in (4), expected profits are
decreasing in α.
For the open set of parameter values for which the contract described in (4) is the
optimal flexible contract, we can easily see that the effect on the Principal’s profit of
increasing the Agent’s imprecision aversion is unambiguously negative. The expected
wage bill the Principal has to pay is in fact in this case given by
pˆ(uˆ+ cx) + (1− pˆ)(u¯+ cy) + pˆ
α(x, θ1)
pˆi(x, θ1)− pˆi(y, θ2)− (α(x, θ1)− α(y, θ2))
∆c
Recall that α(x, θ1) = α
p¯i(x,θ1)−pi(x,θ1)
2
and α(y, θ2) = α
p¯i(y,θ2)−pi(y,θ2)
2
and substitute
these terms in the above expression. If we then differentiate it with respect to α we
readily see that the expected wage bill is always increasing in α. Increasing the degree of
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imprecision aversion will therefore lower expected profits at the flexible contract and favor
rigid contracts, whose profits are independent of α. The same is clearly true for increases
in the Agent’s imprecision, that is of the width of the interval [p¯i(x, θ1)− pi(x, θ1)].
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is decomposed into three Propositions (A.1 to A.3)
Proposition A.1: At an optimal flexible contract the compensation exhibits the
following properties: w¯1 ≥ w¯2 ≥ w2 ≥ w1, and w¯1 > w1. Furthermore:
(i) if w2 > w1, then w¯1 > w¯2 and (IC3) and (IC4) are binding, while (IC1), (IC2),
(IC5) and (IC6) are slack.
(ii) if w2 = w1, then w¯1 = w¯2 and (IC3) binds, while (IC1), (IC2), and (IC4)
are automatically satisfied ((IC1) and (IC4) as equalities), and (IC5) and (IC6) are
slack.14
Proof.
Step 1: At an optimal solution w¯2 ≥ w2.
Proof. Suppose not, that is, w¯2 < w2.
Then, it is immediate to show, given that cy < cx, pi(y, θ1) < pi(x, θ1), and pi(y, θ2) <
pi(x, θ2), that both (IC1) and (IC5) are slack. Start with (IC1): the right hand side of
(IC1) is strictly greater than the right hand side of (IC3) and hence, (IC1) is slack. For
(IC5), rewrite the constraint as:
[pi(y, θ2)e
−aw¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ2))e
−aw2]eacy ≤ [pi(x, θ2)e
−aw¯2 + (1− pi(x, θ2))e
−aw2 ]eacx
Then, under the assumption, the expression in bracket in the left hand side is strictly
smaller than the one in the right hand side, which implies, together with the order on the
cost, that (IC5) is slack.
We now show that if w¯2 < w2, then it is possible to find an improvement for the
principal by pushing w¯2 and w2 closer. Consider ∆w¯2 > 0 and ∆w2 < 0 (i.e. a discrete
change in w¯2, w2) such that:
(i) pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯2+∆w¯2−cy) + (1 − pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w2+∆w2−cy) = pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cy) + (1 −
pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w2−cy) and,
(ii) pi(y, θ2)∆w¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ2))∆w2 < 0
Note that it is possible to find such a ∆w¯2 and ∆w2 by concavity of the utility function.
By condition (ii), we can conclude that this change improves the principal’s profit. It re-
mains to show that it is feasible and satisfies the remaining incentive and the participation
constraints.
14The argument shows that the stated result holds whenever the agent’s utility function can be decom-
posed as u(w − c) = u(w)u(−c) with u (strictly) concave and increasing (i.e. not only for , CARA).
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(IC2) is trivially satisfied since it does not depend on ∆w¯2 and ∆w2. (IC4) and (IC6)
are satisfied by construction, given condition (i) and the same is true for (PC). Thus,
it remains to show that (IC3) holds. Given that the left hand side of (IC3) remains
unchanged, it is enough to show that:
pi(y, θ1)e
−a(w¯2−cy)+(1−pi(y, θ1))e
−a(w2−cy) ≤ pi(y, θ1)e
−a(w¯2+∆w¯2−cy)+(1−pi(y, θ1))e
−a(w2+∆w2−cy)
This follows from condition (i) and the fact that pi(y, θ1) < pi(y, θ2). Indeed, (i) is equiv-
alent to pi(y, θ2)[e
−a(w¯2+∆w¯2) − e−aw¯2 ] + (1 − pi(y, θ2))[e
−a(w2+∆w2) − e−aw2] = 0. The first
term is negative while the second is positive, so we have, given that pi(y, θ1) < pi(y, θ2),
pi(y, θ1)[e
−a(w¯2+∆w¯2)− e−aw¯2 ]+ (1−pi(y, θ1))[e
−a(w2+∆w2)− e−aw2] > 0, which yields the
desired result. 
Step 2: At an optimal solution w¯1 > w1.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of (IC2). 
Step 3: At an optimal solution (IC3) binds.
Proof. We distinguish two cases, according to whether w2 = w¯2 or w2 < w¯2.
Case 1.: w2 = w¯2 ≡ w2.
In that event, (IC5) is automatically satisfied and therefore can be dropped. Further-
more, (IC3) implies (IC1) which can so also be dropped. Now, by Step 2 w1 < w¯1. Hence,
given that pi(y, θ2) > pi(y, θ1), it is possible to show that (IC3) and (IC4) imply (IC6),
which can be dropped.
Obviously, (IC3) and (IC6) cannot be simultaneously binding. We show next that
(IC3) has to bind and therefore (IC6) is slack. Assume not, i.e., (IC3) is slack and
consider (an infinitesimal change) dw¯1 < 0, dw1 = 0 and dw2 > 0. Since (IC3) is
slack, for sufficiently small such quantities it continues to hold. (IC4) and (IC6) remain
satisfied. Choosing dw¯1 = −
(1−p)e−a(w2−cy)
ppi(x,θ1)e−a(w¯1−cx)
dw2 ensures that the participation constraint
continues to hold. By construction, the change in the objective function is equal to
(1 − p)
[
e−a(w2−cy)
e−a(w¯1−cx)
− 1
]
dw2. Given that dw2 > 0, this quantity is positive (hence leading
to an increase in the objective function) if e−a(w2−cy) > e−a(w¯1−cx), that is if w¯1 > w2+∆c.
This property always holds in the case under consideration (w2 = w¯2): (IC3) can in fact
be rewritten as follows:
pi(x, θ1)e
−aw¯1 + (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−aw1 ≤ e−a(w2+∆c),
which in turn implies, together with the property w¯1 > w1 established in Step 2, that
e−aw¯1 < e−a(w2+∆c), and therefore w¯1 > w2 +∆c.
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Hence, whenever (IC3) is slack we can find a perturbation of the wage bill that increases
the Principal’s profit, contradicting optimality of the contract. Therefore (IC3) has to
bind (and hence (IC6) is slack).
Case 2.: w2 < w¯2.
Assume (IC3) is slack and consider a discrete change ∆w2 > 0 and ∆w¯2 < 0 such that:
(i) pi(y, θ2)∆w¯2+(1−pi(y, θ2)∆w2 < 0 and (ii) pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯2+∆w¯2)+(1−pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w¯2+∆w2) =
pi(y, θ2)e
−aw¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ2))e
−aw¯2 . Such numbers exist by strict concavity of u.
Notice that (IC2), (IC4), (IC6) and (PC) are unaffected by these changes and thus
continue to hold. We now check (IC1). The left hand side is unchanged and we therefore
need to show that: pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯2−cx)+ (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w2−cx) ≤ pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯2+∆w¯2−cx)+
(1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w2+∆w2−cx), which is equivalent to
pi(x, θ1)[e
−aw¯2 − e−a(w¯2+∆w¯2)] + (1− pi(x, θ1))[e
−aw2 − e−a(w2+∆w2)] ≤ 0
But this holds as a consequence of (ii), given that ∆w2 > 0 and ∆w¯2 < 0 and pi(x, θ1) >
pi(y, θ2). Thus, (IC1) continues to hold.
It remains to check (IC5). By construction, the left hand side is unaffected by the
change. Given that pi(x, θ2) > pi(y, θ2), one can replicate the argument showing that (IC1)
holds to prove that (IC5) holds as well. 
Step 4: At an optimal solution (IC6) is slack.
Proof. Given that w¯2 ≥ w2 and pi(y, θ2) ≥ pi(y, θ1), we have
pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cy)+(1−pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w2−cy) ≤ pi(y, θ1)e
−a(w¯2−cy)+(1−pi(y, θ1))e
−a(w2−cy).
From the previous step, we know (IC3) is binding, and hence
pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cy) + (1− pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w2−cy) ≤ pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯1−cx) + (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w1−cx)
Given that w¯1 > w1 and pi(x, θ1) ≥ pi(x, θ2), this establishes that (IC6) is slack, i.e.
pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cy) + (1− pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w2−cy) < pi(x, θ2)e
−a(w¯1−cx) + (1− pi(x, θ2))e
−a(w1−cx)

Step 5: At an optimal solution (IC5) is slack.
Proof. If w¯2 = w2, this is obvious. Consider next the case w¯2 > w2. Then, pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cy)+
(1−pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w2−cy) ≤ pi(y, θ1)e
−a(w¯2−cy)+(1−pi(y, θ1))e
−a(w2−cy). From Step 3 we know
that (IC2) binds, i.e., pi(y, θ1)e
−a(w¯2−cy) + (1 − pi(y, θ1))e
−a(w2−cy) = pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯1−cx) +
(1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w1−cx).
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Now, by (IC1), pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯1−cx) + (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w1−cx) ≤ pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯2−cx) + (1−
pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w2−cx) and hence, since w¯2 > w2 and pi(x, θ1) > pi(x, θ2), pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯1−cx) +
(1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w1−cx) < pi(x, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cx) + (1− pi(x, θ2))e
−a(w2−cx). As a consequence,
pi(y, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cy) + (1− pi(y, θ2))e
−a(w2−cy) < pi(x, θ2)e
−a(w¯2−cx) + (1− pi(x, θ2))e
−a(w2−cx)
showing that (IC5) is slack. 
Step 6: At an optimal solution, w¯1 ≥ w¯2 and w1 ≤ w2. Furthermore, if w1 = w2, then
it must be the case that w¯1 = w¯2.
Proof. Rewrite (IC1) and (IC4) as follows:
pi(x, θ1)
[
e−aw¯1 − e−aw¯2
]
≤ (1− pi(x, θ1))
[
e−aw2 − e−aw1
]
(5)
pi(y, θ2)
[
e−aw¯2 − e−aw¯1
]
≤ (1− pi(y, θ2))
[
e−aw1 − e−aw2
]
(6)
Assume w¯1 < w¯2, then (5) implies that w1 > w2 and (5) and (6) yield that:
pi(x, θ1)
1− pi(x, θ1)
≤
e−aw2 − e−aw1
e−aw¯1 − e−aw¯2
≤
pi(y, θ2)
1− pi(y, θ2)
But this is not possible given that pi(y, θ2) < pi(x, θ1). Hence, w¯1 ≥ w¯2. A similar
argument establishes that w1 ≤ w2.
Finally, suppose that w1 = w2. Then, using the fact that (IC3) is binding, one can
rewrite (IC2) as follows:
pi(y, θ1)e
−a(w¯2−cy) + (1− pi(y, θ1))e
−a(w2−cy) ≤ pi(y, θ1)e
−a(w¯1−cy) + (1− pi(y, θ1))e
−a(w1−cy)
which yields w¯1 = w¯2, since we assumed that w1 = w2 and we proved above that w¯1 ≥ w¯2.
. 
Step 7: At an optimal solution (IC2) is slack if w1 < w2. If w1 = w2, (IC2) is
automatically satisfied as equality.
Proof. Use (IC3), which is binding, to rewrite (IC2) as follows:
pi(y, θ1)e
−a(w¯2−cy) + (1− pi(y, θ1))e
−a(w2−cy) ≤ pi(y, θ1)e
−a(w¯1−cy) + (1− pi(y, θ1))e
−a(w1−cy)
(7)
If w1 < w2, (7) is equivalent, given that w¯1 ≥ w¯2, to
e−aw¯2 − e−aw¯1
e−aw1 − e−aw2
≤
1− pi(y, θ1)
pi(y, θ1)
But we know by (IC4) that
e−aw¯2 − e−aw¯1
e−aw1 − e−aw2
≤
1− pi(y, θ2)
pi(y, θ2)
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and hence, since pi(y, θ1) < pi(y, θ2), (IC2) is slack.
If w1 = w2, then we know that w¯1 = w¯2 and (7) - hence (IC2) - is automatically
satisfied. 
Step 8: At an optimal solution (IC1) and (IC4) cannot be simultaneously binding if
w1 < w2. If w1 = w2 they are both automatically satisfied (as equalities).
Proof. Assume w1 < w2 and observe that if (IC1) and (IC4) were binding, one would
have
1− pi(x, θ1)
pi(x, θ1)
=
e−aw¯2 − e−aw¯1
e−aw1 − e−aw2
=
1− pi(y, θ2)
pi(y, θ2)
a contradiction. 
Step 9: At an optimal solution, if w1 < w2 (IC4) binds.
Proof. Assume w1 < w2 and (IC4) is slack and consider changing w¯1 and w1 by
respectively ∆w¯1 < 0 and ∆w1 > 0 such that, (i) pi(x, θ1)∆w¯1 + (1 − pi(x, θ1))∆w1 < 0
and (ii), pi(x, θ1)e
−a(w¯1+∆w¯1)+(1−pi(x, θ1))e
−a(w1+∆w1) = pi(x, θ1)e
−aw¯1+(1−pi(x, θ1))e
−aw1.
Such a change exists by strict concavity of the utility function and provides higher profit
to the principal.
Furthermore, this change does not affect (IC1), (IC3), and (PC) and is feasible given
that (IC2), (IC4), (IC5) and (IC6) are slack. Hence, (IC4) has to be binding at an optimal
solution whenever w1 < w2. 
Steps 1-9 complete the proof of Proposition A.1. From this result it then immediately
follows:
Corollary A.1: The optimal flexible contract can be obtained as a solution to the simpler
programme below:
maxw¯1,w1,w¯2,w2 p[pi(x, θ1)(R¯− w¯1) + (1− pi(x, θ1))(R− w1)]
+(1− p)[pi(y, θ2)(R¯− w¯2) + (1− pi(y, θ2))(R− w2)]
s.t.

(IC3), (IC4), (PC) (as stated in (P flex)) and
(WI) w¯1 ≥ w¯2
(WII) w¯2 ≥ w2
(P flex,R)
Observe the constraint w2 ≥ w1 is implied by (WI) and (IC4).
Proposition A.2: Under Assumption 1, 2, there exists a solution to problem
(P flex,R) (and hence also to (P flex)).
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Proof. The two binding constraints (IC3) and (IC4) enable one to solve for z¯1 = e
−aw¯1
and z1 ≡ e
−aw1 as a function of z¯2 ≡ e
−aw¯2 and z2 ≡ e
−aw2 , yielding:
z¯1 =
(
(1− pi(y, θ2))[pi(y, θ1)z¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ1))z2]e
−a∆c − (1− pi(x, θ1))[pi(y, θ2)z¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ2))z2]
)
pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ2)
z1 =
(
pi(xθ1)[pi(y, θ2)z¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ2))z2]− pi(y, θ2)[pi(y, θ1)z¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ1))z2]e
−a∆c
)
pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ2)
We now want to establish that under the condition 1−pi(y,θ1)
1−pi(x,θ1)
≥ ea∆c, it is possible to
find 0 ≤ z¯2 ≤ z2 such that:
z¯1 > 0
z¯1 ≤ z¯2
z2 ≤ z1
z¯2 ≤ z2
These inequalities ensure that values of the wages satisfying w¯1 ≥ w¯2 ≥ w2 ≥ w1 can be
found.
The first inequality is equivalent, under the condition 1−pi(y,θ1)
1−pi(x,θ1)
≥ ea∆c, to
(1− pi(x, θ1))pi(y, θ2)− (1− pi(y, θ2))pi(y, θ1)e
−a∆c
(1− pi(y, θ2))[(1− pi(y, θ1))e−a∆c − (1− pi(x, θ1))]
<
z2
z¯2
(8)
The next two inequalities are actually equivalent (again under the condition 1−pi(y,θ1)
1−pi(x,θ1)
≥
ea∆c) to the same inequality:
pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ1)e
−a∆c
(1− pi(y, θ1))e−a∆c − (1− pi(x, θ1))
≥
z2
z¯2
(9)
Thus, to show that we can find some values z¯2, z2 satisfying the last inequality, z¯2 ≤ z2,
and such that (8) and (9) hold, we need to establish that the following holds:
max
(
1,
(1− pi(x, θ1))pi(y, θ2)− (1− pi(y, θ2))pi(y, θ1)e
−a∆c
(1− pi(y, θ2))[(1− pi(y, θ1))e−a∆c − (1− pi(x, θ1))]
)
<
pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ1)e
−a∆c
(1− pi(y, θ1))e−a∆c − (1− pi(x, θ1))
Straightforward computation shows that, under the assumption that 1−pi(y,θ1)
1−pi(x,θ1)
≥ ea∆c,
this is indeed the case.
Before solving problem (P flex,R), observe that one can rewrite it, with the following
change of variables z = e−aw, as a problem with a (strictly) concave objective and linear
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constraints:
maxz¯1,z1,z¯2,z2 p[pi(x, θ1)(R¯ +
log z¯1
a
) + (1− pi(x, θ1))(R +
log z1
a
)]
+(1− p)[pi(y, θ2)(R¯ +
log z¯2
a
) + (1− pi(y, θ2))(R +
log z2
a
)]


(IC3′) pi(x, θ1)e
acx z¯1 + (1− pi(x, θ1))e
acxz1 = pi(y, θ1)e
acy z¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ1))e
acyz2
(IC4′) pi(y, θ2)e
acy z¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ2))e
acyz2 = pi(y, θ2)e
acy z¯1 + (1− pi(y, θ2))e
acyz1
(PC ′) p[pi(x, θ1)e
acx z¯1 + (1− pi(x, θ1))e
acxz1]+
(1− p)[pi(y, θ2)e
acy z¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ2))e
acyz2] ≤ e
−au¯
(WI ′) z¯1 ≤ z¯2
(WII ′) z¯2 ≤ z2
(P˜ flex,R)
Proposition A.3: At a solution to the program ( P˜ flex,R), (PC ′) binds. Further-
more, we have that w¯2 > w2.
Proof. Consider the program (P˜ flex,R). Let λ3, λ4, λPC , λI , and λII denote the La-
grange multipliers associated to the constraints of this problem. The first order conditions
obtained by differentiating the Lagrangean with respect to z¯1, z¯2, z2, z1 are then:

(i) ppi(x,θ1)
az¯1
= λ3pi(x, θ1)e
acx − λ4pi(y, θ2)e
acy + λPCppi(x, θ1)e
acx + λI
(ii) p(1−pi(x,θ1))
az1
= λ3(1− pi(x, θ1))e
acx − λ4(1− pi(y, θ2))e
acy
+λPCp(1− pi(x, θ1))e
acx
(iii) (1−p)pi(y,θ2)
az¯2
= −λ3pi(y, θ1)e
acy + λ4pi(y, θ2)e
acy
+λPC(1− p)pi(y, θ2)e
acy − λI + λII
(iv) (1−p)(1−pi(y,θ2))
az2
= −λ3(1− pi(y, θ1))e
acy + λ4(1− pi(y, θ2))e
acy
+λPC(1− p)(1− pi(y, θ2))e
acy − λII
Multiplying each equation by the appropriate z variable, adding the four equations of
the above system and using the fact that (IC3′) and (IC4′), in the above specification of
the optimization problem, are written as equalities, yields the following:
1
a
= λPC [ppi(x, θ1)e
acx z¯1 + p(1− pi(x, θ1))e
acxz1
+(1− p)pi(y, θ2)e
acy z¯2 + (1− p)(1− pi(y, θ2))e
acyz2] + λI [z¯1 − z¯2] + λII [z¯2 − z2]
Using the complementarity slackness condition, we get that λI [z¯1− z¯2] = λII [z¯2−z2] =
0. Hence λPC > 0, which establishes that (PC
′) binds. Hence, we can conclude from the
expression above that λPC =
eau¯
a
.
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Next we want to show that w¯2 > w2 or equivalently z2 > z¯2. Assume to the contrary
that z¯2 = z2 ≡ z2. We know in that case that (WI
′) is slack (otherwise by (IC4′) all
wages would have to be equal, but this would contradict the fact that (IC3′) binds) and
hence λI = 0. Rewrite now FOC’s (iii) and (iv) as:

(iii) (1−p)
az2
= −λ3
pi(y,θ1)
pi(y,θ2)
eacy + λ4e
acy + λPC(1− p)e
acy + λII
pi(y,θ2)
(iv) (1−p)
az2
= −λ3
1−pi(y,θ1)
1−pi(y,θ2)
eacy + λ4e
acy + λPC(1− p)e
acy − λII
1−pi(y,θ2)
This implies that
−λ3
pi(y, θ1)
pi(y, θ2)
eacy +
λII
pi(y, θ2)
= −λ3
1− pi(y, θ1)
1− pi(y, θ2)
eacy −
λII
1− pi(y, θ2)
or, after some simplification,
λII = (pi(y, θ1)− pi(y, θ2))λ3e
acy
Note that (pi(y, θ1) − pi(y, θ2)) < 0 and hence λII ≥ 0 iff λ3 ≤ 0. Next observe that
(PC ′) as an equality together with (IC3′) imply, if z¯2 = z2 ≡ z2, that z2 = e
−a(cy+u¯).
Plug now the values of λPC and z2 into equations (iii) and (iv) and use the expression
for λII obtained above. The two equations are identical and yield λ4 = λ3 ≡ λ.
We have so a system of four equations – FOC’s (i) and (ii), (IC3′) and (IC4′) – to
determine three variables: λ, z¯1 and z1. (IC3
′) and (IC4′) can be used to solve directly
for z¯1 and z1. Now, the two FOC’s can be rewritten:
ppi(x, θ1) = aλz¯1(pi(x, θ1)e
acx − pi(y, θ2)e
acy) + eau¯z¯1ppi(x, θ1)e
acx
p(1− pi(x, θ1)) = aλz1((1− pi(x, θ1))e
acx − (1− pi(y, θ2))e
acy) + eau¯z1p(1− pi(x, θ1))e
acx
Adding these two equations yields an equation
p = aλ [z¯1(pi(x, θ1)e
acx + z1(1− pi(x, θ1))e
acx − pi(y, θ2)z¯1e
acy − z1(1− pi(y, θ2))e
acy ] +
+peau¯ [z¯1pi(x, θ1)e
acx + z1(1− pi(x, θ1))e
acx ]
which, using (IC3′) and (IC4′) can be rewritten as:
p = aλ
[
eacye−a(cy+u¯) − eacye−a(cy+u¯)
]
+ peau¯
[
eacye−a(cy+u¯)
]
= p
[
eacye−acy
]
= p
always satisfied, so that one of the two above equations can be dropped. The remaining
one can be used to solve for λ. Recall that λ ≤ 0 is needed to ensure that λII ≥ 0.
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Solving then (IC3′) and (IC4′) with respect to z¯1 and z1 we get:
z1 =
pi(x, θ1)e
−a(cy+u¯) − pi(y, θ2)e
−a(cx+u¯)
pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ2)
z¯1 =
(1− pi(y, θ2))e
−a(cx+u¯) − (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(cy+u¯)
pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ2)
.
Substituting into the first of the two FOC’s above yields:
ppi(x, θ1) =[aλ(pi(x, θ1)e
acx − pi(y, θ2)e
acy) + eau¯ppi(x, θ1)e
acx ]·
·
(1− pi(y, θ2))e
−a(cx+u¯) − (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(cy+u¯)
pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ2)
and hence
aλ(pi(x, θ1)e
acx − pi(y, θ2)e
acy)
(1− pi(y, θ2))e
−a(cx+u¯) − (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−a(cy+u¯)
pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ2)
(10)
= ppi(x, θ1)− ppi(x, θ1)e
acx
(1− pi(y, θ2))e
−acx − (1− pi(x, θ1))e
−acy
pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ2)
=
= ppi(x, θ1)
[
(1− pi(x, θ1))e
a∆c − (1− pi(y, θ2)) + pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ2)
pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ2)
]
=
= ppi(x, θ1)
[
(1− pi(x, θ1))(e
a∆c − 1)
pi(x, θ1)− pi(y, θ2)
]
> 0
Since the coefficient of λ in the first term is positive, it follows that the solution for λ
of such equation is > 0, a contradiction. Hence, it cannot be that z¯2 = z2.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The first best optimal contract is obtained as solution of the problem of maximizing the
principal’s expected profits subject to the agent’s participation constraint, which under
risk neutrality takes the following form:
maxw¯1,w1,w¯2,w2 p[pi(x, θ1)(R¯− w¯1) + (1− pi(x, θ1))(R− w1)]
+(1− p)[pi(y, θ2)(R¯− w¯2) + (1− pi(y, θ2))(R− w2)]
s.t.
p[pi(x, θ1)w¯1 + (1− pi(x, θ1))w1 − cx]+
(1− p)[pi(y, θ2)w¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ2))w2 − cy] ≥ u¯
The maximal level of the principal’s expected profits that can be attained at a solution
of this problem is then clearly the one stated in the proposition and it is immediate to
verify that the compensation profile given in (1) yields such level of expected profits and
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is then a first best optimum. It remains thus to verify the values in (1) satisfy all the
incentive compatibility constraints, which under risk neutrality take the following form:


pi(x, θ1)w¯1 + (1− pi(x, θ1))w1 ≥ pi(x, θ1)w¯2 + (1− pi(x, θ1))w2
pi(x, θ1)w¯1 + (1− pi(x, θ1))w1 − cx ≥ pi(y, θ1)w¯1 + (1− pi(y, θ1))w1 − cy
pi(x, θ1)w¯1 + (1− pi(x, θ1))w1 − cx ≥ pi(y, θ1)w¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ1))w2 − cy
pi(y, θ2)w¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ2))w2 ≥ pi(y, θ2)w¯1 + (1− pi(y, θ2))w1
pi(y, θ2)w¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ2))w2 − cy ≥ pi(x, θ2)w¯2 + (1− pi(x, θ2))w2 − cx
pi(y, θ2)w¯2 + (1− pi(y, θ2))w2 − cy ≥ pi(x, θ2)w¯1 + (1− pi(x, θ2))w1 − cx
(11)
This is immediate by direct substitution. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
We first consider a local deviation from the contract specified in (4) such that dw1 > 0
and such that (IC3∗), (IC4∗) and (PC∗) continue to hold as equalities. We conjecture,
and verify below, that the sign of the changes in the other wage variables is as follows,
dw¯1 < 0, dw¯2 > 0, and dw2 < 0, and in the Agent’s expected utility in the two θ states is
du(θ1) < 0, du(θ2) > 0. That is, the Agent is no longer fully insured in state θ2 nor across
states θ1 and θ2, which fixes his “beliefs” in the incentive and participation constraints.
Differentiating (IC3∗), (IC4∗) and (PC∗), written as equalities, with respect to w¯1, w1, w¯2, w2,
and solving these equations for dw¯1, dw¯2, dw2, as a function of dw1 > 0 yields:
dw¯1 =
[
−1
(pˆ + α(p))(pˆi(x, θ1) − α(x, θ1)) + (1 − pˆ− α(p))(pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2))
+ 1
]
dw
1
(12)
dw¯2 =
[
1 −
pˆi(x, θ1) − α(x, θ1) − pˆi(y, θ2) + α(y, θ2) + [pˆi(y, θ1) − α(y, θ1) − pˆi(x, θ1) + α(x, θ1)][pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2)]
[(pˆ+ α(p))(pˆi(x, θ1) − α(x, θ1)) + (1 − pˆ− α(p))(pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2))][pˆi(y, θ1) − α(y, θ1) − pˆi(y, θ2) + α(y, θ2)]
]
dw
1
dw
2
=
[
1 −
[pˆi(y, θ1) − α(y, θ1) − pˆi(x, θ1) + α(x, θ1)][pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2)]
[(pˆ+ α(p))(pˆi(x, θ1) − α(x, θ1)) + (1 − pˆ− α(p))(pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2))][pˆi(y, θ1) − α(y, θ1) − pˆi(y, θ2) + α(y, θ2)]
]
dw
1
It is immediate to verify from the above expressions that the sign of the changes is the
one conjectured.
The change in the Principal’s profit is given by
−{pˆ [pˆi(x, θ1)dw¯1 + (1− pˆi(x, θ1))dw1] + (1− pˆ) [pˆi(y, θ2)dw¯2 + (1− pˆi(y, θ2))dw2]}
Substituting for dw¯1, dw¯2, dw2 the expressions found in (12) yields:
{
− 1 +
pˆpˆi(x, θ1) + (1− pˆ)pˆi(y, θ2)
[(pˆ + α(p))(pˆi(x, θ1) − α(x, θ1)) + (1− pˆ − α(p))(pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2))]
+(1− pˆ)
[pˆi(x, θ1) − α(x, θ1) − pˆi(y, θ1) + α(y, θ1)]α(y, θ2)
[(pˆ + α(p))(pˆi(x, θ1) − α(x, θ1)) + (1− pˆ − α(p))(pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2))][pˆi(y, θ1) − α(y, θ1) − pˆi(y, θ2) + α(y, θ2)]
}
dw
1
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The sign of this expression can be positive or negative, depending on the parameters of
the model, as claimed in the text: it is positive when α(p) = α(y, θ2) = 0, α(x, θ1) > 0
and it is negative when α(x, θ1) = 0.
The other possible deviation, with dw1 < 0, can be treated in a similar fashion. The
wage changes have here the opposite sign as above, hence the induced beliefs need to be
modified accordingly. The expression for the change in expected profits in that case is
then:
{
− 1 −
pˆpˆi(x, θ1) + (1 − pˆ)pˆi(y, θ2)
[(pˆ− α(p))(pˆi(x, θ1) − α(x, θ1)) + (1− pˆ + α(p))(pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2))]
−(1 − pˆ)
pˆi(y, θ2)[pˆi(y, θ1) + α(y, θ1) − 2α(y, θ2) − pˆi(x, θ1) − α(x, θ1)]
[(pˆ− α(p))(pˆi(x, θ1) − α(x, θ1)) + (1− pˆ + α(p))(pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2))][pˆi(y, θ1) + α(y, θ1) − pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2)]
−(1 − pˆ)
−(pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2))(pˆi(y, θ1) + α(y, θ1)) + (pˆi(y, θ2) + α(y, θ2))(pˆi(x, θ1) − α(x, θ1))
[(pˆ− α(p))(pˆi(x, θ1) − α(x, θ1)) + (1− pˆ + α(p))(pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2))][pˆi(y, θ1) + α(y, θ1) − pˆi(y, θ2) − α(y, θ2)]
}
dw
1
The Principal would benefit from this deviation only if the term appearing in curly
brackets is negative (as in this case dw1 < 0). This term is negative if and only if
(pˆi(y, θ2) + α(y, θ2)− pˆi(y, θ1)− α(y, θ1))×
[(pˆ − α(p))(pˆi(x, θ1)− α(x, θ1)) + (1− pˆ− α(p))(pˆi(y, θ2)− α(y, θ2))] −
(1− pˆ)α(y, θ2)[pˆi(x, θ1)− α(x, θ1)− pˆi(y, θ1)− α(y, θ1)] > 0
It can be shown that the expression on the left hand side of the above inequality is
bounded above by
−α(x, θ1)pˆ(pˆi(y, θ2)+α(y, θ2)−pˆi(y, θ1)−α(y, θ1))−(1−pˆ)α(y, θ2)[pˆi(x, θ1)−α(x, θ1)−pˆi(y, θ2)−α(y, θ2)]
which is always negative. Hence, the considered deviation is never optimal.
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